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The Perceptual Loop Theory Not Disconfirmed:
A Reply to MacKay
W illem  J. M. L ev elt
M ax Planck Institute fo r  Psycholinguistics,
Nijmegen, The Netherlands
In his paper, MacKay reviews his Node Structure theory o f error detection, but 
precedes ¡t with a critical discussion of the Perceptual Loop theory of self-monitoring 
proposed in Levelt (1983, 1989). The present commentary is concerned with this latter 
critique and shows that there are more than casual problems with M acKay’s argumen­
tation. © 1992 A c a d e m ic  P re s s . In c .
In Levelt (1989) I reviewed the existing theories of self-monitoring in speech 
production, and concluded:
When we compare the editing account and the connectionist account, the most worrisome 
diagnosis is that, as they stand, both are very hard to disconfirm. (p. 476)
Since then, the situation has hardly changed. In his paper, MacKay (1992) out­
lines his connectionist Node Structure theory and cites some data with which it 
is compatible. But that is barely progress. What one would like to see is a con­
certed effort to disprove the theory’s predictions in a truly Popperian fashion. 
However, neither MacKay nor others (including myself) have endeavored on this 
enterprise. As long as this is the situation, MacKay’s theory is just one among 
other plausible accounts, no more, no less.
A bit more Popperian is MacKay’s introductory discussion of the Perceptual 
Loop theory (PLT), my version of an editing account. MacKay tries to discount 
the theory on the basis o f internal inconsistency and lack o f empirical support. 
But his attack only shows how right I was when I wrote that even my own theory, 
as it stands, is hard to disconfirm. Let me go over MacKay’s arguments.
In Levelt (1989) I cited the Lackner and Tuller findings as support for the 
existence of an internal and an external loop in self-monitoring. There is, in 
particular, the nontrivial result that speakers were faster in detecting their own 
speech errors when they listened to white noise (the masking condition) than 
when their overt speech was unmasked. In the masking condition speakers can 
use only their internal loop, and this loop is shorter than the external loop; this 
corresponds to shorter error detection latencies (and, of course, less detections). 
MacKay does not deny the force of this argument, but claims that other aspects 
of the Lackner and Tuller findings are hard to reconcile with PLT.
One aspect is that the detection of voicing errors (e.g., /di/ for /ti/) suffered
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much more from masking than the detection o f place of articulation errors (e.g., 
/di/ for /gi/). I argued that the acoustic difference between voiced and unvoiced 
is much more substantial than the acoustic difference between places of articula­
tion (such as alveolar versus velar). There is, however, no obvious reason to 
suppose that a similar state of affairs holds for internal speech (and it may be the 
other way around). Hence, masking (which obliterates the acoustic difference) 
will affect the detection of voicing more than the detection of place of articulation. 
MacKay argues that it is problematic to talk about the size of a phonetic differ­
ence in internal speech (I don’t think that it is) and that my kind of argument 
requires a comparison between sizes of (internal) articulatory and (overt) acoustic 
features. The latter is incorrect. It only requires a measure of phonetic saliency 
within each o f the two domains (internal and overt speech), not between them. 
If the sizes of voicing and place differences are the same in internal speech, but 
different in overt speech, then the Lackner and Tuller finding follows from PLT.
A second result that MacKay finds hard to explain by PLT is that voicing errors 
occurred more often than place of articulation errors. But PLT is a theory of 
error monitoring, not a theory of error production. Still, MacKay argues that the 
point is essential because "errors in general may have been detected faster with 
masking in Lackner and Tuller not because of reliance on an internal loop, but 
because of a reduced criterion for accuracy,” i.e ., a higher speed/accuracy ratio 
under masking. That may or may not be so, but it does not explain why this then 
leads to more voicing errors as opposed to articulation errors. Hence, these data 
are irrelevant for the evaluation of PLT.
MacKay then turns to other things that PLT does not or cannot explain. One 
example of the first kind is this: “ If masking causes suppression of the external 
loop for error detection, how do speakers monitor and respond to loudness of 
the masking itself?” (i.e., by speaking louder). Not much of a problem here. PLT 
says that speakers listen while they speak. Hence they hear the noise and can 
respond to it. In PLT the decision of how to respond is a central one, not a mere 
automatism. The speaker can stop, speak a bit louder, remove the headphones, 
or start weeping.
Another example of the first kind is “ how the perceptual system is able to 
detect deviations from linguistic standards.” Here MacKay is right. I never devel­
oped a detailed account of how listeners detect linguistic ill-formed ness, except 
for the detection of ill-formed compounds (Levelt, van Gent, Haans, & Meijers, 
1977). And to the best of my knowledge, nobody else ever did.
An example of the second kind concerns the detection of lexical substitution 
errors (like table for chair). There is a “ representational” problem here, ac­
cording to MacKay, “ because the perceptual system begins at best . . . with a 
phonetic representation of the output. However, lexical errors cannot be detected 
using a phonetic representation because nothing is phonetically wrong with words 
that are substituted in error.” This is even a “ logical inconsistency” in the theory, 
it is said. How does MacKay suppose a listener recognizes that a word is correctly 
used? There must be a “representational problem” and a “ logical inconsistency” 
there as well because the listener surely begins with some kind of phonetic repre­
sentation of the word. Still, if I point at a chair and say table , my hearer will
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probably notice that I made an error. So, what’s the problem? In PLT the speaker 
compares the meaning of a parsed word to the intended notion. If I intend to 
express the notion TABLE and then hear myself say chair, there will be a mis­
match at the conceptual level, and I may become aware o f it.
MacKay concludes this unusual “ representational” argument as follows: 
“ Such considerations suggest that instead of occurring at only one or two points 
or levels in the production process, editing must be a distributed or “ everywhere” 
characteristic that permeates the entire output/perception process, from the high­
est level concepts to the lowest level phonetic units. To capture this distributed 
aspect of error detection, PLT requires as many loops as there are units involved 
in error.” However, in PLT, monitoring does not take place in the production 
process at all, let alone at all of its levels. It is precisely the core proposition of 
PLT that monitoring is mediated by the speaker’s language comprehension sys­
tem. It would have been a good question to ask how the comprehension system 
spots trouble at different levels of processing (e.g., acoustic, phonetic, morpho­
logical, semantic, syntactic, pragmatic trouble). MacKay is apparently horrified 
by the idea that editing must be distributed over all levels of processing, and so 
am 1. But that is exactly how his own Node Structure theory accounts for the 
detection of trouble in units of various levels or size.
A final shortcoming is quite cryptic: “ if the same system processes other- 
produced and self-produced inputs, including errors, how do characteristics that 
fail to enter awareness when speech is produced correctly suddenly enter aware­
ness when an error is produced?” Does MacKay mean that if other-produced 
and self-produced inputs were handled by different systems the answer would be 
obvious? I don’t see the argument.
MacKay then turns to several predictions derived from PLT, sketching a bleak 
picture of their empirical support. The seven predictions and my comments are, 
in short:
(1) The detection of phonological errors should be faster than the detection of 
word errors.
This need not be so. We know that syllable detection is faster than phoneme 
detection and we know that there is a lexical effect in phoneme detection. Similar 
things may happen in error detection. It is not necessarily the case that lower 
level units can be attended to faster than higher level units. But whatever is the 
case, there are simply no data available that are relevant to this issue.
(2) Monitoring of self-produced speech and of other-produced errors should 
exhibit identical error tendencies.
This has been claimed before by MacKay (1987) and rejected by Levelt (1989, 
pp. 471-472). MacKay does not take the trouble to answer the criticism. It says, 
in short, that monitoring is task and context dependent, as any attentional pro­
cess. The aims of monitoring are vastly different between a speaking task and a 
listening task. Hence, one should not expect identity o f monitoring error tend­
encies.
(3) Speakers should sometimes produce pseudocorrections. If they misperceive 
a self-produced item, they should tend to correct it and produce the same item 
again.
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That is a fine prediction, and I can remember making such pseudocorrections 
myself. But then I read “ However, pseudocorrections have so far never been 
reported in cases o f word meaning and word sound deafness, which is a problem 
for PLT.” It is, I would say, quite a bit more problematic for error collectors; 
apparently nobody ever looked for them. A child can detect reduplications in 
spontaneous speech, but they are not the stuff that is collected by our industrious 
colleagues. If some of these reduplications turn out to be pseudocorrections, then 
that is problematic for the Node Structure theory.
(4) Overt speech errors should be easier to detect than the mental errors that 
occur during internal speech.
MacKay reports that such a difference was not found by Dell (1978, 1980), but 
that it did arise in Dell and Repka (in press). Hence, there is some support for 
the prediction.
(5) The lexical bias in speech errors (predicted by PLT) should also hold for 
blends.
There is overwhelming evidence for the existence of lexical bias in speech 
errors (see Levelt, 1989, for a review). There is no disagreement with MacKay 
that this is so nor that PLT can explain it. Lexical bias is also predicted by 
connectionist accounts of monitoring (cf. Levelt, Schriefers, Vorberg, Meyer, 
Pechmann, & Havinga, 1991). But according to MacKay there is a problem with 
blends. He discusses an unpublished study (by Collins and Ellis), to which I have 
no access; it does not find lexical bias in case of blends (such as sotally as a blend 
of solely and totally). That should then be a problem for PLT. But it isn’t. Ac­
cording to PLT, what the speaker monitors for and intercepts is task and context 
dependent. Monitoring for lexical status is subject to selective attention, as was 
convincingly shown in an experiment by Baars, Motley, and MacKay (1975). 
Lexical bias could be induced or annulled, dependent on the contextual setting. 
It is never surprising when lexical bias does not arise. It does not arise, for 
instance, in del Viso et al.’s (1991) data, and these are not blends. And apparently 
it does not arise in one study on blends. There is no special status for blends, I 
would say, as far as lexical bias is conccrned.
Later in the paper, MacKay considers whether PLT could be extendable to 
other output systems, such as typing and handwriting. I never claimed anything 
about typing or handwriting, and PLT was solely developed for self-monitoring 
in speech. But, for the case o f argument, I will add these predictions here:
(6) Detection of correct responses should be faster than detection of errors.
This is, apparently, contradicted in research on typing. Why should PLT make
that prediction? According to MacKay this is because there is much more experi­
ence with error-free output than with erroneous utput, so we should be faster on 
the error-free stuff. But this, again, ignores the attentional aspect of self- 
monitoring. If we would spend our limited attention exclusively on what we 
do correctly (because that is the default case), self-monitoring would betray its 
ecological function: to prevent error. PLT predicts that we will attend to trouble 
in the first place, and what you attend to, you do relatively fast.
(7) Error detection will improve depending on how much external feedback is 
provided or allowed in typing or handwriting.
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MacKay mentions three studies that support the claim for relatively unskilled 
typists. The latter detect less errors when they cannot see the paper. One study 
finds the same for skilled typists when they reach for relatively unpracticed keys, 
but for practiced keys there is no difference. So there is good support for the 
prediction, except in the latter case. And there the explanation is obvious: exter­
nal feedback becomes less necessary for practiced typists. They must be relying 
more on their internal feedback loop, and nothing in PLT forbids us to make the 
same claim for feedback in speech production.
So, what is the harvest? There were seven predictions. The first one does not 
necessarily hold, and there is no evidence for or against it. The second one is 
incorrect; it does not follow from PLT. There is no evidence for or against the 
third prediction. There is some empirical support for the fourth one, and strong 
support for the fifth. The sixth prediction does not follow from PLT, and the 
seventh prediction is supported in the majority of studies.
Question: has PLT been disconfirmed by MacKay?
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